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Contemporary physics and cosmology have accumulated a great deal of em-
pirical evidence for the claim that in order for our universe to contain life, 
an array of incredibly precise laws, constants, and specific initial conditions 
had to be in place. The minuscule odds of this happening purely by chance 
have prompted some Christian thinkers to suggest that this can be seen as 
novel evidence that the universe was fine-tuned specifically to give rise to bi-
ological life. And yet some Christian thinkers also wish to make the case that 
molecular biology provides new evidence to the effect that life could not have 
arisen naturally in our universe, but rather that the origin of life required 
additional special divine intervention. There is at least a prima facie tension 
between these two ideas. Relatedly, some have raised the question of why, if 
the universe were fine-tuned for life, it was also set up in such a way that the 
origin of life was preceded by more than 10 billion years of lifelessness. If life 
was the whole point, why the seeming delay? In this paper I suggest a way 
Christian thinkers might address both issues: namely, the cosmos was not 
fine-tuned for life, but merely for the possibility of life. Perhaps God wanted 
a universe in which biological organisms were possible (including intelligent 
organisms like us) but in which their non-existence was also a live possibility. 
I develop this solution in dialogue with related ideas arising from the demo-
nologies of St. Augustine, Boethius, and St. Anselm.
1. Introduction
The philosophical and theological literature on alleged cosmic fine-tuning 
is substantial.1 The basic empirical claim is that contemporary physics and 
cosmology have provided good evidence to the effect that in order for 
1See for instance Barr, Modern Physics; Collins, “The Teleological Argument”; Koperski, The 
Physics of Theism, ch. 2; Lennox, God’s Undertaker, ch. 4; Leslie, Universes; McGrath, A Fine-Tuned 
Universe; Ross, Why the Universe Is the Way It Is; and Swinburne, The Existence of God, ch. 8.
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biological life to exist in our universe, a whole array of incredibly precise 
laws, constants, and initial conditions had to be in place. The inference 
drawn from this is that such precision is unlikely to have been the product 
of mere random chance, so that the probability of the cosmos being intel-
ligently designed for life is high. Oftentimes this is developed further into 
a piece of natural theology, an argument for theism aimed at persuading 
non-theists; at other times the evidence for fine-tuning is laid out simply 
as an item for in-house reflection amongst Christians, to employ as part of 
our discussions of divine providence in relation to physical nature. (For 
reasons that will soon become clear, in what follows our focus will be on 
fine-tuning considered within this latter context.)
There is also a substantial literature on alleged biological design, with 
the more recent entries in this literature being particularly focused on the 
idea that contemporary molecular biology has provided novel evidence 
to the effect that biological life could not have arisen naturally in our 
universe, but required separate intervention by an intelligent (perhaps 
supernatural) agent.2 Once again, this evidence is often presented as part 
of an argument for theism, though it too can likewise be put forward more 
as a topic for discussion amongst Christians regarding the nature, modes, 
and purpose of special divine action in the cosmos. E.g., one might pursue 
this line of inquiry simply from the perspective of whether it makes more 
sense theologically to suppose that biological life was fully “front-loaded” 
into the universe at the big bang (such that life was bound to arise natu-
rally after that), or whether God wished to intervene specially to create 
life afterwards.
These two distinct lines of evidence for fine-tuning/design can of course 
be pursued independently, such that one can be accepted and the other 
rejected. (In fact, it is not uncommon for Christian thinkers to advocate for 
cosmic fine-tuning while staunchly rejecting the notion that there was later 
divine intervention to bring about biological life. For instance, Lamou-
reux, in his recent book Evolution: Scripture and Nature Say Yes, provides a 
clear defence of this stance.) Christian thinkers might also reject both, with 
neither rejection necessarily impacting their larger theological system or 
preferred scriptural interpretations. But can both lines of evidence be ac-
cepted as indicative of genuine fine-tuning or intelligent design? Or is there 
a tension, perhaps even incompatibility, between them?
Dougherty and Poston argue that there is at least a serious tension be-
tween those who wish to use cosmic fine-tuning as evidence for theism and/
or for a certain understanding of divine providence, and those who wish to 
invoke biological intelligent design along the same lines. Their development 
of the idea is detailed and sophisticated, and framed in terms of Bayesian 
probability theory. Still, the basic point can be simply stated:
2See for instance Axe, Undeniable; Behe, Darwin’s Black Box; The Edge of Evolution; Darwin 
Devolves; Dembski, Intelligent Design; Denton, Evolution; Lennox, God’s Undertaker, chs. 6–11; 
and Meyer, Signature in the Cell.
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In rough outline, the fine-tuning argument proceeds as follows: the a pri-
ori probability that the initial conditions of the universe and the values of 
the constants of the fundamental laws take their actual values is incredi-
bly low. . . . So the fact that the initial conditions and the constants of the 
fundamental laws have such and such actual values provides evidence for 
theism. The biological-design argument proceeds as follows (again in rough 
outline): it’s incredibly unlikely that biologically complex organisms would 
exist somewhere or other in our universe. How unlikely? If we are to infer 
divine action from the existence of biologically complex organisms it must 
be nothing short of miraculous. That is ‘statistical impossibility’. But note that 
if life is statistically impossible given the initial conditions of the universe, 
then there is very little sense to the notion that the universe is fine-tuned for 
life. True, there is some sense in which life is possible in such a universe, for 
God might specially create a micro-environment suitable for life. But that’s 
true of any set of initial conditions.3
In other words, those advocating cosmic fine-tuning rely on the idea that 
the designer of the cosmos wanted it to contain life and so laid out its 
constants and initial conditions with that end in mind; and according to 
some, the designer wanted not merely to permit life, but to structure the 
cosmos in such a way that life would eventually arise naturally within it. 
Dougherty and Poston4 quote Swinburne as a prominent proponent of 
this interpretation of fine-tuning, with the latter writing that there “will 
be an argument from the existence of human (and animal) bodies to the 
existence of God of any great strength, via the route of ‘fine-tuning’, only 
if it follows that a fine-tuned universe will (not merely possibly but with 
significant probability) lead to embodied humans and animals.”5 The im-
plication there is that a fine-tuned universe is designed for life precisely in 
the sense that it will of itself be naturally disposed to give rise to biological 
organisms. By contrast, those advocating the teleological argument from 
biological intelligent design rely on the idea that life could not have arisen 
naturally in the cosmos, and instead must have been the result of a new 
and distinctive special intervention by a designer long after the big bang. 
But the second teleological argument seems to conflict with the first, since 
if life could not have arisen naturally in the cosmos then it seems less 
likely that the cosmos was actually designed with life as the specific end 
in mind.
Naturally there are potential replies to this argument, some of which 
are taken up by Dougherty and Poston. One that is particularly relevant 
for our purposes is as follows:
It might be objected by the apologist who wishes to hold on to both the FTA 
[fine-tuning argument] and the BDA [biological design argument] that God 
might find it more valuable to first create a world which allowed for, but 
probabilistically precluded, life and then add life in as a ‘fingerprint’. To this 
3Dougherty and Poston, “A User’s Guide,” 100.
4Dougherty and Poston, “A User’s Guide,” 103. 
5Swinburne, The Existence of God, 189.
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we have three replies. First, either the FTA or the BDA by themselves would 
count as such a ‘fingerprint.’ Secondly, it would take independent argument 
that this was a better state of affairs than a single-stage creation as the strong 
FTA advocate alleges; it is not enough to merely assert that it is. Finally, 
notice that all the work in such a two-stage approach is being done by the 
BDA data, the ‘fine-tuning’ data simply serve as a backdrop to make biolog-
ical design stand out. Thus this approach is not a reply to our criticisms but 
rather a capitulation and a choice of the BDA over the FTA.6
So they reject the suggestion that the FTA be re-conceived in such a way 
that the designer’s proximate intention be understood not as an intention 
to design for life, but merely for the possibility of life. They reject it in large 
part because the apologist’s suggestion is that God did this in order to 
showcase more clearly for us the fact of His particular care for the design 
of life—to reveal to us that life is the product of His special intervention. 
Dougherty and Poston dismiss as implausible this “revelatory strategy” 
approach to reconciling the FTA with the BDA. We thus have a problem 
before us: is there a way to understand God’s providential plan for physical 
nature such that the FTA and the BDA are rendered clearly compatible?
Another, not unrelated question that can be raised with respect to al-
leged fine-tuning is this: if God intended the physical cosmos to give rise 
to life (whether of its own accord or with the later assistance of additional 
divine intervention), why is the cosmos set up in such a way that it took 
at least 10 billion years for life to arise? What theological sense can we 
make of this seeming delay in the origin of life? Or in other words: how 
are we to understand this aspect of God’s providential plan? After all, if 
life is an intrinsic good, and in particular if the prospect of life is supposed 
to be motivating cosmic fine-tuning, why leave the universe devoid of it 
for eons? (As with the FTA/BDA consistency issue, this delayed life issue 
can be presented as a problem for natural theology in the context of the 
dialogue with atheism,7 or as an in-house question for Christian philos-
ophers and theologians trying to get a clearer understanding of God’s 
providential purposes for our universe. Our focus will again be on this 
latter, in-house angle.)
So we have two problems before us: (a) the problem of rendering com-
patible the FTA and the BDA, and (b) the question of how to understand 
what might have motivated the extended delay in the origin of life in a 
cosmos allegedly fine-tuned for life. While replies to these problems can 
of course be pursued independently of each other, it would be nice if there 
were some way of killing these two birds with one stone; it would be nicer 
if the core ideas employed in that single solution were also demonstrably 
non-ad hoc, perhaps already having an established place in historical the-
ology; and it would be nicer still if that single solution drew on widely 
6Dougherty and Poston, “A User’s Guide,” 105.
7For an entry point into that side of the delayed life issue see Dumsday, “Does a Delayed 
Origin for Biological Life Count as Evidence Against the Existence of God?” 
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accepted, uncontroversial ideas within the Christian tradition, commonly 
maintained across denominations and within both modernist and tradi-
tionalist theological circles. As we’ll soon see, the solution I will suggest 
meets the first two desiderata, but most assuredly does not meet the third. 
In fact, it violates the third with reckless abandon. That will disqualify it 
for some. Still, it may be worth exploring anyway.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows: in the next section 
we take a detour into patristic and medieval demonology, examining St. 
Augustine’s claim that humanity was created as a replacement for fallen 
angels. This idea was later taken up by Boethius and St. Anselm, after 
which it was largely abandoned in western theology. This may initially 
seem like rather a wide detour; but as we’ll see, it is a necessary precursor 
to § 3, where I suggest a way of modifying St. Augustine’s idea in such a 
way that it is rendered somewhat less theologically problematic, and also 
able to address both the delayed life issue and the tension between the 
FTA and BDA. Finally, in § 4 some potential objections are considered.
I should emphasize again: the FTA and the BDA have multiple potential 
applications within philosophy and theology. As already noted, some dis-
cuss one or another of these lines of evidence in the course of arguing for 
the truth of theism against non-theists, others simply by way of pursuing 
a deeper understanding of divine providence. This paper is concerned 
solely with the FTA and the BDA from the latter angle; the reason for this 
narrowed focus is that if one were instead trying to show the compatibility 
of the FTA and BDA as part of a strategy for ensuring their joint work-
ability as arguments against atheism, reference to medieval angelology 
and demonology would likely render one’s point worse than useless in 
that particular dialectical context. Much the same can be said regarding 
the delayed life issue: it can be broached as part of the atheism vs. theism 
dialectic or as an in-house topic for Christians interested in examining the 
possible providential reasons behind the timing of life’s appearance, but 
if angels are being brought into the discussion then prudence dictates it 
should probably be restricted to the latter.8 If one is addressing a specif-
ically Christian audience (and more specifically a traditionalist Christian 
audience that already accepts the reality of angels and demons), then 
there is at least a non-negligible chance of encountering some openness to 
the present proposal.
2. Patristic and Medieval Theologians on Humanity  
as a Replacement for Fallen Angels
The notion that God may have created humanity not for its own sake (or 
at least not primarily for its own sake), but with some other providential 
goal in mind, is one with a long history in Christian thought. Among the 
alternative providential goals that has been suggested is the following: 
8Though I suppose one never knows: perhaps there are some secularists with a soft spot 
for angels!
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God created human beings to fill up the spots in the heavenly kingdom 
left vacant by fallen angels. Thus, God initially set out to create rational 
free beings, namely the angels. God hoped that the angels would choose 
eternal communion with Him in the kingdom of heaven, and furthermore 
He had a particular number in mind (i.e., God’s creating x number of an-
gels was not a purely arbitrary decision—He had purposefully settled on 
a certain number to fill the heavenly host). However, some of those angels 
turned away from Him, thereby constituting themselves as demons. This 
left gaps in the desired number within the kingdom of heaven. God chose 
to fill those gaps by creating additional rational free beings, but rather than 
creating new angels He opted to create a different kind of entity, a being 
whose nature would be a mixture of rational and animal and who would 
be capable of sexual reproduction; so rather than God Himself having 
to create a massive number of new humans to fill the gap left by fallen 
angels, He had only to create two, male and female, graciously leaving 
in their hands the task of cooperating with His plan by producing new 
humans, whose subsequent descendants would eventually be sufficiently 
numerous to replace the fallen angels (and perhaps even to exceed that 
original number). But of course this second plan also did not quite work 
out as intended, since Adam and Eve fell too. God mercifully persisted 
in His intention to have humans fill the place of fallen angels, but now in 
order for them to fulfill that role they first had to be redeemed by His Son.
That is the basic outline of the replacement thesis, which finds its begin-
nings in St. Augustine and is later picked up by other patristic and medieval 
theologians. Novotny, in his book Cur Homo? A History of the Thesis Con-
cerning Man as a Replacement for Fallen Angels, has produced a concise 
history of its role within Christian thought, and my summary above and 
in the remainder of this section is indebted to his work both in identifying 
relevant texts and interpreting the idea. The scope of my discussion will 
however be much narrower, focusing only on a select few figures.
The general idea comes up in several of St. Augustine’s works, in-
cluding one of his sermons: “In the heavens, you see, there is no being 
born or dying, from the moment when everything there was established. 
The chief of all the angels could indeed fall from there, together with his 
companions; but instead of those angels who fell, human beings are going 
to come there, and fill up the place of those who fell.”9 The basic notion 
appears in other Augustinian texts, including Enchiridion 29:
And so it pleased God, the Creator and Governor of the universe, that, since 
the whole body of the angels had not fallen into rebellion, the part of them 
which had fallen should remain in perdition eternally, and that the other 
part, which had in the rebellion remained steadfastly loyal, should rejoice 
in the sure and certain knowledge of their eternal happiness; but that, on 
the other hand, mankind, who constituted the remainder of the intelligent 
creation, having perished without exception under sin, both original and 
9The citation is from St. Augustine’s Sermo 229/H,2, found in Hill, 296.
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actual, and the consequent punishments, should be in part restored, and 
should fill up the gap which the rebellion and fall of the devils had left in 
the company of the angels. For this is the promise to the saints, that at the 
resurrection they shall be equal to the angels of God. And thus the Jerusalem 
which is above, which is the mother of us all, the city of God, shall not be 
spoiled of any of the number of her citizens, shall perhaps reign over even a 
more abundant population.
Consider finally the following, from City of God:
Now God inflicted on the apostate angels, for their self-chosen fall, the just 
punishment of everlasting misery. . . . And God made man also upright, with 
the same power of free choice, an animal of earth, yet worthy of heaven if 
he adhered to the author of his being, but, by the same token, destined, if he 
abandoned God, for a misery appropriate to his kind of nature. Now God 
foreknew that man would sin by breaking God’s Law through his apostasy 
from God; and yet, as in the case of the angels, God did not deprive man of 
the power of free choice, foreseeing, at the same time, the good that he was 
to bring out of man’s evil.10 For out of this mortal progeny, so rightly and 
justly condemned, God by his grace is gathering a people so great that from 
them he may fill the place of the fallen angels and restore their number. And 
thus that beloved Heavenly City will not be deprived of its full number of 
citizens; it may perhaps rejoice in a still more abundant population.11
Another early Christian author who takes up the replacement theme is 
Boethius, in an early portion of his short work On the Catholic Faith:
But although in heaven all things are beautiful and arranged in due order, 
yet one part of the heavenly creation which is universally termed angel-
ic, seeking more than nature and the Author of Nature had granted them, 
was cast forth from its heavenly habitation; and because the Creator did not 
wish the roll of the angels, that is of the heavenly city whose citizens the 
angels are, to be diminished, He formed man out of the earth and breathed 
into him the breath of life; He endowed him with reason, He adorned him 
with freedom of choice and established him in the joys of Paradise, mak-
ing covenant aforehand that if he would remain without sin He would add 
him and his offspring to the angelic hosts; so that as the higher nature had 
fallen low through the curse of pride, the lower substance might ascend 
on high through the blessing of humility. But the father of envy, loath that 
man should climb to the place where he himself deserved not to remain, 
put temptation before him and the consort whom the Creator had brought 
forth out of his side for the continuance of the race, and laid them open to 
10It is worth noting that although Augustine adopts a specific account of divine fore-
knowledge in relation to time (according to which God wholly transcends created temporal 
realms and so knows past, present, and future in an eternal/atemporal act of intellectual vi-
sion that from our temporal vantage point seems like foreknowledge), and although Boethius 
and Anselm adopt very similar understandings of God’s relationship to time, I see no com-
pelling reason why this would be essential to their shared commitment to the replacement 
thesis. I expect that open theists (for instance) could defend much the same idea, just paired 
with their own alternative account of divine temporality. 
11Augustine, City of God, bk. 22, ch. 1, 1022–1023. 
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punishment for disobedience, promising man also the gift of Godhead, the 
arrogant attempt to seize which had caused his own fall.
The replacement thesis, and variants of it, appear in other patristic fig-
ures and early medieval authors. Novotny points to St. Gregory the Great 
as proposing a version according to which God did not create man as a 
replacement, but He did save man in order to replace the fallen angels.12 
Gregory thus shifts the focus of the idea from creation to salvation. But 
the original idea comes up again in multiple places within the works of St. 
Anselm, with one important locus of discussion being Cur Deus Homo.13 
The treatment there is somewhat complex, and Anselm considers argu-
ments for and against the replacement thesis, but Novotny maintains that 
Anselm’s final position is in favour of it.14
The historical origins of the replacement thesis having now been 
reviewed, its potential relevance for our purposes can now be stated ex-
plicitly: supposing that thesis were true, and moreover that God had first 
created the physical universe and the angels (with the universe perhaps 
being intended as something the angels would have stewardship over) 
but had not yet created biological organisms (let alone humanity), then 
one could make some theological sense of the idea that the universe was 
designed not for life but for the possibility of life. God, foreseeing the pos-
sibility of an angelic fall and the potential need to replace the fallen angels 
with intelligent biological organisms, wanted a universe in which such 
organisms could be brought about if needed; but since such organisms 
would principally be a “backup plan” or corrective remedy, the universe 
would not be designed in such a way as to guarantee the occurrence of 
intelligent biological organisms (or indeed any biological organisms).15 
Indeed it might have been designed in such a way as to allow for their nat-
ural survival should God choose to intervene and create them specially, 
but also designed in such a way that they could not arise naturally, in 
the absence of such special intervention. After all, on this hypothesis God 
wanted them on the scene only in the event that some of the angels fell.
Such a scenario, were it theologically acceptable, would serve to resolve 
the alleged tension between the FTA and the BDA, and would go some 
way towards explaining the delay in life’s origin. It would address the 
latter by providing a non-ad hoc explanation as to why the universe was 
set up in such a way that life did not arise early in cosmic history; God 
12Novotny, Cur Homo, 37.
13Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, bk. 1, chs. 17–23, 268–284. 
14Novotny, Cur Homo, 58–59.
15The scare quotes around “backup plan” are intended to draw attention to the fact that 
depending on one’s view regarding divine eternity vs. temporality (e.g., classical theism’s 
atemporal God vs. one or another variety of open theism), one may or may not regard this as 
a literal indicator of putting a contingency plan in place for an unexpected outcome. Certainly 
Augustine’s original idea was not intended to entail that God was faced with new-to-Him 
facts by either the angelic fall or by Adam’s fall, even though Augustine clearly speaks of the 
relevant replacement as being in some sense a response to the angelic fall. 
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had good reason to set the universe up in such a way that life would not 
arise naturally at all, let alone quickly. And perhaps the angelic fall did 
not take place until around the 11 billion year mark after the big bang, 
further explaining the delay in the start of the replacement process? Or 
perhaps the angelic fall happened early on in the history of the cosmos but 
God was content to wait quite a while to begin the replacement process? 
Or perhaps the sempiternal time in which the angels dwell is relevantly 
incommensurable (in whole or in part) with cosmic time, rendering tricky 
any attempted pairing of the two timescales? In any case, given the truth of 
the replacement thesis life’s delay does receive an explanation, one whose 
central components have not been developed simply to solve the problem, 
but rather have longstanding roots in historical theology (thus showing it 
is not an ad hoc solution). With respect to the former problem, the tension 
between the FTA and the BDA is resolved insofar as cosmic fine-tuning is 
reinterpreted as fine-tuning not for life but merely for the possibility of life, 
which is entirely compatible with the claim that the actual occurrence of 
biological organisms requires further divine intervention.
That is not to say, however, that it would be entirely prudent to adopt 
the patristic/medieval replacement thesis wholesale and simply import it 
into the current debate over fine-tuning. Leaving aside (for now) concerns 
about bringing in literal talk of demons in order to address our two prob-
lems, later theological history should itself prompt caution. That history 
was in fact rather unkind to the replacement thesis, and after St. Anselm it 
is mostly opposed whenever it comes up for explicit discussion.
An early critic is Rupert of Deutz (circa 1075/1080–1129). Novotny re-
lates how Rupert raises the question of why, if God had been so concerned 
to restore a particular number to the heavenly kingdom, He hadn’t just 
created a massive swathe of new angels to fill the place of the fallen.16 Why 
bring humanity into the picture at all, if replacement was the only aim?17 
16Novotny, Cur Homo, 76.
17In fairness it should be noted that Anselm had foreseen Rupert’s worry, and attempted 
to address it:
And additional angels cannot take their place [i.e., the place of the fallen angels] 
because . . . it would not be right for them to do so unless they could be such as the 
other angels would have been if they had not sinned. Now those original angels 
would have persevered without having seen God’s vengeance upon sin; but once 
the original angels fell, that would be impossible for the additional angels who 
would be meant to take their place. For these two are not equally praiseworthy 
if they remain steadfast in the truth: one who has known no punishment for sin, 
and one who is always face to face with an eternal punishment. (Cur Deus Homo, 
bk. 1, ch. 17, 268)
In other words, the newly created replacement angels would inevitably become aware of 
the prior fallen angels’s damnation, such that their perseverance in virtue might then be 
motivationally inseparable from rational fear of punishment, and consequently less praise-
worthy than those original angels who persevered simply from love of God. As such, the 
hypothetical angelic replacements, even if they persevered in virtue, would inevitably not be 
as good as the original angels who persevered, and so in the relevant sense would not really 
be (adequate) replacements. One worry (perhaps soluble?) facing this Anselmian reply would 
revolve around the question of whether it would have been possible and/or proper for God 
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Novotny further summarizes Rupert’s own preferred stance regarding 
the purpose of humanity’s creation: “Man was not created for angels (that 
is, as a replacement for those who fell so that the number of those who 
persevered was completed); rather, the truth is that angels and all other 
creatures, including men, were created for man, meaning for Jesus Christ, 
the incarnate Word of God, through whom they are to become alike unto 
God, just as sons are like their fathers.”18 This stance, and variants of 
it, becomes the standard view, being advocated by Honorius of Autun, 
Alain of Lille, Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great, St. 
Bonaventure, and St. Thomas Aquinas. The developing consensus was 
that God created humanity out of love for humanity, and a desire that it 
should share in God’s own blessedness. Humanity was not created with 
the primary purpose of fulfilling a subordinate providential role, subordi-
nate that is to some other order of being within creation (like the angels). 
Humanity was made for its own good, for the overarching good order and 
completion of the cosmos, and (relatedly) for the glory of God. Still, these 
authors are sometimes willing to admit some truth to the Augustinian 
position. For instance Hugh of St. Victor argues that although man was 
not created for the purpose of replacing the fallen angels, as a matter of 
fact man’s salvation does have the happy side-effect of accomplishing that 
replacement, and Aquinas adopts the same view.19
So the replacement thesis was seen as problematic on at least two 
major fronts: (1) there was the problem of why, if fallen angels needed 
replacing (in order to maintain some divinely decreed minimum number 
of heavenly inhabitants) God didn’t just create more angels, and keep 
creating them until a sufficient quantity refrained from rebellion that the 
desired number was reached. In other words, humanity might function 
as a replacement, but it is not clear why humanity specifically was intro-
duced to fill that role. The replacement thesis as originally formulated 
seems therefore to be faced with an explanatory gap. (2) There seems 
something theologically problematic (and/or offensive?) to the suggestion 
that humanity’s original primary purpose was to fill up a gap left by some 
other order within creation. While no one likes a jingoistic, unthinking 
anthropocentrism, this might seem to denigrate humanity’s status. That 
denigration (if it is a denigration) would not merely offend our vanity, but 
also potentially conflict with the high status accorded us within scripture 
as objects of God’s love and providential care.
Given the unhappy fate of the replacement thesis in later western the-
ology, it would perhaps be unwise to place our bets on it as the basis of a 
reply to the delayed life argument and as a strategy for resolving the ten-
to bring new angels on the scene while also blocking their knowledge of past events in angelic 
history, including the fallen angels’s desertion. This gets into deeper questions regarding 
Augustinian and Anselmian views on angelic epistemology. 
18Novotny, Cur Homo, 82–83.
19See Novotny, Cur Homo, 119, 140.
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sion between the FTA and BDA or the delayed life question. Still, I think 
that a closely related idea might yet be able to do that work. This idea 
bears sufficient family resemblance to the replacement thesis that it too 
can plausibly avoid the charge of ad-hoccery, and correspondingly enjoy 
the advantage of having some precedent within historical theology. Yet 
it differs enough that it can also sidestep the more pressing theological 
objections facing the original replacement thesis. It does however still 
rely on acceptance of the literal reality of demons. That reliance will be 
a deal-breaker for many. But for readers who already believe in angels 
and demons (or at least are not wholly closed to the idea) the following 
suggestion may be worth considering.
3. Replacing the Replacement Thesis
In later western theology (most Scholastics after Peter Lombard), there 
arose a broad consensus that angels are purely spiritual entities, wholly 
incorporeal.20 That consensus has largely persisted, both in Catholic an-
gelology and (to a considerable degree) Protestant angelology as well. 
However, that consensus was lacking in the patristic period, where a 
variety of perspectives on angelic corporeality existed; moreover, in 
contemporary Eastern Orthodox theology that patristic diversity has con-
tinued, with there being no official Church teaching on the issue. Yet even 
those fathers (including Augustine) who thought of angels as in some 
sense corporeal generally thought that their mode of corporeality was 
very different from that of human beings—the type of matter they were 
associated with was often thought of as very different, and certainly the 
angels were not thought of as biological organisms with the sorts of traits 
we associate with living things (metabolism and reproduction and vul-
nerability to natural death etc.). St. John of Damascus is not atypical when 
he writes that angels, in comparison with humans, are incorporeal since 
they lack bodily shape and spatial extension.21 Yet in comparison with 
God (who alone is wholly spiritual) they are very much embodied. Since 
demons were usually viewed as fallen angels, this conception carried over 
to them, although it was sometimes proposed that the bodies of demons 
were composed of a grosser/baser matter than that of unfallen angels.22
While cognizant of this historical diversity, in what follows I will as-
sume for the sake of argument the post-medieval western consensus that 
angels and demons are wholly incorporeal. (The relevance of this will be-
come apparent shortly.) With that assumption in mind let us return to one 
of the themes of the replacement thesis as laid out in the previous section: 
20One might think that the advocacy of universal hylomorphism by figures like Bonaven-
ture would contradict this point, but really it does not. The “prime matter” referenced in 
universal hylomorphism is not equivalent to the prime matter of Aquinas and other Scholas-
tics, and is very far from what we would normally think of as “material.” 
21John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3, 205–207.
22For further background on the history of discussions surrounding angelic and demonic 
corporeality, see Keck, Angels, ch. 5, and Russell, Satan and Lucifer. 
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God first created the physical cosmos and the angels. The timing of the 
angelic creation vis a vis the cosmos is not specified in scripture, but it has 
been widely (though not universally) held in both patristic and medieval 
theology that God either created the angels before the cosmos or not long 
after the cosmos; and it has been widely (though not universally) held that 
the creation of the angels preceded the creation of humanity.
Building on that, suppose an additional idea present in patristic the-
ology, namely that God initially left the cosmos to the care and stewardship 
of the angels (or some subset of them). Further, at some point after this be-
stowal of stewardship, a large group of those angels rebelled against God, 
thereby constituting themselves as demons. Those fallen angels went on 
to wreak havoc on that cosmos, corrupting God’s creation in a variety of 
ways.23 And suppose further that this is all long before humanity came 
on the scene, and perhaps also long before any biological life appeared 
in the cosmos. (Just what would corruption-of-creation have looked like, 
prior to the introduction of life and opportunities for inflicting pain and 
death on organisms? That is not clear; presumably it would have involved 
some sort of deliberate deviation from God’s ordained structuring of the 
cosmos, but details here are difficult to fathom, and any attempt to flesh 
them out is liable to seem decidedly odd.)
Now suppose that God did not want to allow this corrupted state of 
affairs to continue indefinitely. There are of course a variety of ways in 
which He could have corrected the situation; for instance, He could have 
annihilated all of the fallen angels and then miraculously fixed whatever 
harm they might have done to the order of the cosmos. However, that 
would be seen by many as a theologically suspect strategy, insofar as 
historically most Christian thinkers have maintained that God never anni-
hilates any of His rational creations, whether angelic or otherwise. (That 
historical fact helps to constitute one of the standard objections against 
annihilationist conceptions of hell.) So, another obvious option would 
have been to leave the demons in existence but remove from them any 
active ability to affect the cosmos, and then miraculously correct for any 
harm they might have done to it. However, that too is liable to sit poorly 
with traditional theological conceptions, according to which God is usu-
ally loath to rescind immediately a stewardship responsibility, upon that 
responsibility being abused. The consistent Biblical portrayal seems rather 
to be one in which the unfortunate consequences of sin are allowed to 
play out, at least for a time. (This is obviously connected to larger issues of 
theodicy, and why it is that God allows humans to persist in wrecking our 
own lives when He could supernaturally stop us.)
Now consider a third option: perhaps God could choose to correct the 
damage done to His creation “from the inside,” as it were. That is, perhaps 
23The notion that God initially gave angels stewardship over the physical universe, and 
that fallen angels took it upon themselves to corrupt that universe, is affirmed by a number 
of patristic authors. See for instance Athenagoras’s A Plea for the Christians, chs. 10 and 24–25.
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God could choose to grant rationality and freedom to some component 
of the material cosmos, and grant to that spiritual/material hybrid the 
providential task of redeeming the cosmos, of wresting control of it from 
the fallen angels. How exactly this might work is obscure; but since the 
demons are (on the present hypothesis) wholly immaterial whereas these 
new beings would be partly spiritual and partly material, perhaps the 
latter’s greater degree of intrinsic union with the basic stuff of the cosmos 
could in turn grant them a greater power over it, or at least the possibility 
of exercising such power by the grace of God. In other words, perhaps 
humanity came into an already-fallen cosmos with a high, noble, even 
heroic job to do: to take back that cosmos from the demons, restoring it to 
God’s original intended order.
The idea that humanity came into the world with such a redemptive task 
already before it is of course not an original one.24 The twist I would like to 
add to it (inspired by the replacement thesis) is the following: perhaps the 
primary purpose of humanity was this redemptive mission, such that if the 
cosmos had not needed fixing (on account of abuse by fallen angels) it may 
be that God never would have created humanity, and perhaps never would 
have created any sort of biological life. Perhaps God’s original plan for our 
reality was to have the physical cosmos and the angels, and that’s it. How-
ever, foreseeing that some of the angels might fall, and in particular that 
some of the angels who had been granted stewardship over the cosmos 
might fall, God designed the cosmos in such a way that it had the ingre-
dients of a “backup plan” already built-in: the cosmos was designed to 
allow for biological life just in case circumstances became so dire that God 
opted to institute the aforementioned redemptive plan. In other words, 
God designed the universe not for life but for the possibility of life, which 
possibility only He could realize through subsequent divine intervention—
intervention first to create biological life, and then subsequent intervention 
to ensure its evolution toward humanity.
If the present scenario were theologically palatable, it would have the 
virtue of singlehandedly resolving both the delayed life question and 
the FTA/BDA tension. It would accomplish the former by providing a 
non-ad hoc way of explaining why it is that God might have designed the 
cosmos in such a way that life was not naturally liable to arise, let alone 
arise quickly. This solution would be further assisted if one supposed 
that the angelic fall might have occurred relatively late in cosmic history, 
and/or that angelic time and cosmic time are not wholly commensurable, 
and/or that God had good reason for delaying the start of the redemptive 
project after the angelic fall had occurred. Regarding the last disjunct, 
such a delay would certainly accord with the aforementioned theological 
idea that God typically delays taking away an evil being’s stewardship 
over its own domain—the idea of immediate or even quick correction of 
24C. S. Lewis for instance nicely lays out the general idea in The Problem of Pain, 106–108, 
and in Miracles, 125–126. 
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a being’s sin does not accord with the Biblical portrayal of God generally 
allowing a being to exercise its freedom over an extended time, and of 
His allowing the effects of sin to become manifest. As to the FTA/BDA 
tension, the present proposal would dissolve it by providing a theological 
explanation for God’s initially designing the cosmos not for life but for 
the possibility of life, and for why the subsequent occurrence of life would 
have required additional divine intervention.
So, the present scenario (for ease of reference, let’s call it the redemption 
thesis) can solve both those problems. But then so could the replacement 
thesis; that thesis however arguably ran aground on two theological objec-
tions. Is the redemption thesis equally vulnerable to those two objections?
It is clearly immune from the first, which focused on the question of 
why God would opt to replace fallen angels with human souls when He 
could simply have replaced them with new angels. The redemption thesis 
is not proposing that humans are brought in to replace fallen angels, and 
so it does not encounter that problem. What of the second worry? It put 
forward the idea that the status of humanity would be denigrated by the 
supposition that our creation was not done for our own sake but rather to 
serve some task within a subordinate order of creation—namely, filling up 
slots in the heavenly kingdom left vacant by demons. Now, whether or not 
that objection holds with respect to the replacement thesis, I doubt that it 
holds for the redemption thesis; or at least I doubt that it holds with the 
same force. For on the redemption thesis, humanity actually has quite an 
exalted role to play in God’s providential plan for His creation: we are to 
partner with Him in redeeming the cosmos. The idea that humanity might 
not have been part of His original intent for creation, but that we might 
instead have been brought in to correct a problem, need not be thought of 
as diminishing our status. Nor should it be thought of as undermining a 
recognition of God’s love for us; after all, once we were brought into being 
we promptly failed in our redemptive task. Rather than justly destroying 
humanity, God opted instead to institute yet another redemptive plan, one 
that would involve His taking on our nature and dying for our sins. The 
redemption of the cosmos will still occur through humanity, but now it 
will occur through humanity as unified with God in Christ.
In fact, the incarnation provides something of a salutary analogy here. 
There has long been a debate within Christian theology about whether 
God became incarnate only in response to humanity’s fall, or whether 
He would have taken on human nature even if we had never fallen. Both 
views are regarded as theologically orthodox, permissible positions, 
across denominational lines. Suppose now that the first view is true, and 
that the incarnation occurred in the context of a “backup plan,” as a nec-
essary corrective for humanity’s sin that would not have been undertaken 
otherwise.25 Does that in any way diminish the glory of the incarnation 
25Again, the “backup plan” language should not be taken as presupposing any particular 
account of God’s foreknowledge or relationship to time.
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or the exalted status of Jesus Christ? Surely not. By the same token, if the 
very existence of humanity is a response to a previous angelic fall and 
the need to redeem the physical cosmos, the inherent value and glory of 
human nature is not thereby diminished.
Still, even if the redemption thesis sidesteps the particular problems 
facing the replacement thesis, it may be vulnerable to a host of other ob-
jections. In the final section we’ll consider some representative examples.
4. Objections and Replies
(A) The redemption thesis still relies on the idea of literally real demons. This will 
render it unpalatable to many Christians, and wholly unworkable as a reply to 
actual atheists pressing the delayed life argument.
Granted, but as noted in the Introduction, the present discussion should 
be seen mainly as an in-house exercise amongst theologically traditional 
Christians who already buy into theologically traditional notions like lit-
erally real angels. And while there may be the odd atheist out there with a 
soft spot for the angelic, chances are that this fact will render the redemp-
tion thesis useless in addressing an atheist audience regarding issues of 
fine-tuning and the relationship between the FTA and BDA. But there is 
nothing wrong with seeing what internal resources the Christian tradition 
can provide for addressing such issues; likewise a Christian might be in-
terested in the delayed life problem not because she fears being driven to 
atheism by it,26 but because the argument raises an intriguing theological 
question: if the universe is fine-tuned, why the delay in the origin of life? 
What was God up to in permitting this delay, or even actively intending it? 
And the redemption thesis is one option a Christian might consider when 
pondering the ways of God in light of modern cosmology and biology.
It is worth recalling as well that there are arguments available in favour 
of the literal reality of angels and demons: arguments from scripture, tra-
dition, philosophical theology,27 and contemporary religious experience.28 
The present proposal is certainly not alone in its strategy of looking to 
26Though it certainly has been used as part of an argument for atheism—for an overview 
see again Dumsday, “Does a Delayed Origin.”
27One might point for instance to Aquinas’s well-known argument for the reality of angels 
on the basis of a principle of divine creative plenitude—see the Summa Theologica Ia, q. 50, 
art. 1. One might also point to the literature defending the possible relevance of demons 
in explaining so-called “natural” evil: see for instance Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil; 
Bulgakov, Bride; D’Arcy, The Pain of this World; Kelly, “The Problem of Evil and the Satan 
Hypothesis”; Mascall, Christian Theology; Pendergast, “Evil, Original Sin, and Evolution”; 
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity and God, Freedom, and Evil; Trethowan, Essay; D. M. Webb, 
Why Does God Permit Evil?; and S. H. Webb, Dome of Eden.
28A surprisingly large range of sources might be cited here, but of particular interest is 
Heathcote-James, Seeing Angels. This work is a popularized version of her doctoral disser-
tation in cultural anthropology, which collected and analyzed hundreds of recent reported 
experiences of angels in the UK.
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traditional angelology and demonology as a potentially useful source for 
current theological reflection.
(B) Biological life is of such great intrinsic value, God must have intended it from 
the outset. It cannot have been a mere component in a “backup plan” for fixing a 
problem.
I sympathize with this objection, but I worry about the “must.” It is worth 
recalling that the mere fact of something’s being of great intrinsic value 
places God under no rational obligation to create it. There are for instance 
types of biological life that would presumably have been immensely 
valuable, which types God has opted not to instantiate in our cosmos—
unicorns and gryphons, for example. God is wholly free to create or not to 
create. His perfection (and by extension the perfection of Reality) would 
have been utterly undiminished if He had opted against creating anything 
at all. The creation of anything is an act of pure grace. Moreover, while 
biological life is intrinsically valuable, we typically tend to assign it an 
especially high intrinsic value because, as thoroughgoing moderns, we tend 
to assume uncritically the following proposition: finite rational agency re-
quires biological life as a precondition. We humans are, after all, biological 
organisms, and we are the only rational agents we encounter in ordinary, 
everyday life, so it is natural enough to fall into that way of thinking. But 
of course Christian angelology instructs us to be wary of any such as-
sumption; the good of finite rational agency can in fact be instantiated 
without there being any biological life, and on the present proposal that is 
precisely how our finite reality started out—with a physical cosmos and a 
host of free intelligent angels, but no biological life.
(C) All this talk of God having “backup plans” and whatnot is culpably anthro-
pomorphic. God is outside of time, so the idea of God introducing new elements to 
a providential plan in light of sin (whether angelic or human) is just mistaken. If 
God intended to create humanity, that intention could not have been conditional 
on the occurrence of some unexpected state of affairs.
I am not suggesting that God was somehow taken unawares by the angelic 
fall, nor does the redemption thesis presuppose any particular, detailed 
account of the metaphysics of God’s relationship to time. By analogy, 
those who think that God would not have become incarnate had it not 
been for Adam’s sin do not thereby commit themselves to some naive 
view according to which this theological conditional in turn requires that 
God was somehow surprised by Adam’s sin. How exactly the divine con-
sciousness and divine will relate to time and contingency are, to put it 
mildly, contentious topics within Christian thought. Suffice it to say that 
nothing I have said in proposing the redemption thesis need provoke any 
new puzzles on this front, or any unique problems for classical theism 
versus open theism; moreover any such objection would apply just as 
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much to the Augustinian replacement thesis, but as noted in section (2) 
above, there is no persuasive reason to think that that thesis cannot be 
understood in ways compatible with multiple different perspectives re-
garding God’s relationship to time.
My own personal view on such matters is that God is atemporal but 
that this atemporality must somehow still be compatible with a real re-
sponsiveness to the contingencies involved in the actions of genuinely free 
created agents. How exactly to reconcile these two views is not easy, but 
that there must be a path to reconciliation follows from combined theolog-
ical commitments to divine eternity and creaturely freedom. Lossky puts 
the point nicely:
With a certain excusable inexactitude, one could say that God in His prov-
idence condescends to the liberty of men. He acts as a result of this liberty, 
co-ordinating his actions with the acts of created beings, in order to govern 
the fallen universe by accomplishing His will without doing violence to the 
liberty of creatures. Therefore the mystery hidden before all ages in God and 
revealed to angels by the Church,29 this eternal and immutable foredetermi-
nation of the incarnation has at the same time a kind of contingency; one 
could almost say that it was occasional, provided this expression does not 
imply any idea of the unforeseen.30
(D) The redemption thesis seems enormously speculative. For instance, it was al-
ready admitted above that the details of what the demonic corruption of the cosmos 
(prior to the origin of life) might consist in are unclear. Moreover, the details of 
just how exactly humanity was to redeem the cosmos, to regain control of it from 
the fallen angels, have been left sketchy. How is one to evaluate a proposal which 
leaves so many questions unanswered?
Further details would be nice, if in fact one could find a way of plausibly 
fleshing them out. But I must admit that I find myself lacking in the imag-
ination required to supply them. Perhaps for now, this task can be left as 
a topic for future research. I think the redemption thesis does supply at 
least a minimal core of content, content sufficient for evaluating whether 
it has a chance of being theologically workable and whether it can do 
the explanatory work here assigned it: namely, clearing up (at least for a 
Christian audience) the problems raised by the delayed life argument and 
Dougherty and Poston’s observed tension between the FTA and the BDA.
(E) It has already been admitted that the redemption thesis is liable to be taken 
seriously (or semi-seriously) only by traditional Christians. Yet traditional Chris-
tians typically take their theological cues from the Bible and the historical mind 
of the Church, as manifested particularly by the early Church fathers and by later 
key theologians—for Catholics, the latter would include Scholastics like Aquinas, 
29Here Lossky footnotes Ephesians 3:9–10.
30Lossky, Mystical Theology, 139.
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and for Protestants core figures like Luther, Calvin, and the Wesleys. With that in 
mind, the fact that the redemption thesis is nowhere to be found in the Bible or in 
these other sources of theological wisdom is surely a substantial blow against it. If 
humanity were created as part of a “backup plan,” wouldn’t God have revealed to 
us this rather important fact? Some arguments from silence do carry weight, and 
this seems like a good candidate.
Two points by way of reply: (1) the replacement thesis also had no explicit, 
unambiguous Biblical support, yet after its formulation by St. Augustine 
it received respectful attention from Christian thinkers for upwards of 800 
years (though it was eventually rejected). Insofar as the redemption thesis 
borrows from and builds upon the replacement thesis, seeking to correct 
some of its long-recognized problems, perhaps it can borrow some of the 
latter’s historical cachet? (2) Neither the Bible nor the historic tradition of 
the Church was explicitly faced with the cosmic fine-tuning and biological 
design data sets that we are faced with today. As such, there is nothing 
wrong in principle with raising new theological strategies for addressing 
new problems. By way of analogy, there is nothing wrong with coming 
up with novel strategies for attempting to reconcile Christian theology 
with the new data regarding the age of the universe and aspects of Dar-
winian evolution, despite the latter data sets having been unknown to the 
inspired authors of scripture and the early Church Fathers.31
(F) Surely there are other ways of addressing the delayed life problem and the al-
leged tension between the FTA and the BDA, ways that do not rely so heavily on 
controversial theological claims. With that in mind, the redemption thesis should 
be viewed as a last resort solution, one to be referenced only in the event that all 
other solutions to those two difficulties prove unworkable. Since we aren’t there 
yet, there is not much point in discussing so far-out a proposal as this.
Certainly other strategies have been put forward for addressing the de-
layed life issue; much less has been written on the FTA/BDA conflict, but 
that is not to say it is irresolvable. (Perhaps, for instance, the “fingerprint 
of God” reply, considered and rejected by Dougherty and Poston and 
referenced in the Introduction above, is worthy of further discussion.) I 
am not suggesting the redemption thesis is the only workable solution to 
these two problems; however, it is one more option to put on the table, 
and perhaps not an unwelcome one given the current absence of generally 
agreed-upon resolutions. (It also has the virtue of explanatory range, pro-
viding a single resolution to both problems. As of yet there are no other 
proposals for killing these two birds with one stone.) Should it be viewed 
as a “last resort” option? That depends on one’s background assumptions; 
if one is strongly inclined to disbelieve in the literal reality of angels and 
demons, and/or strongly inclined to think that humanity is the original, 
primary goal of cosmic fine-tuning, then indeed the redemption thesis 
31My thanks to an anonymous referee for supplying the latter reply.
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will plausibly be viewed as a last resort. If however one does not share 
those background assumptions, then it may be moved up, if not to the 
front row then perhaps somewhere in the middle—at any rate it needn’t 
be relegated to the nosebleed section.32
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